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Abstract
This paper studies the size and location of urban green areas across city spaces.
Urban green areas offer amenities that affect residential choices, land consumption and
land rent. This paper discusses the socially optimal sizes and locations of urban green
areas within a city and their decentralized allocation through land markets. The main
result is that the share of land dedicated to urban green areas is a concave function
of the distance to the city center. This result is confirmed by the empirical study of
urban structures in the 305 largest EU cities. The importance of urban green areas
is finally assessed by a counterfactual analysis, where 50% of urban green areas are
removed in each city.
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1 Introduction
Urban green areas play a crucial role in the debate on sustainable cities. They are an impor-
tant part of any urban area whose quality and quantity are prime concerns for environmental
sustainability. Recent research has confirmed the relationship between urban parks and the
well-being of city’s residents. Brack (2002) and Strohback et al. (2012) find a strong influ-
ence of urban natural ecosystems in reducing air and noise pollution and CO2 absorption
in Australia and Germany. Heidt and Neef (2008) suggest economic benefits by showing a
significant increase in the nearby property values. Access to nearby urban parks helps reduce
stress and improve psychological well-being1 and increasing physical activities.2
In this paper, we study the geographical distribution of green urban areas in cities and
compare our theoretical results with empirical observations of green urban areas. More
precisely, we study the optimal level of green urban areas in urban spaces. Because green
urban areas are land-intensive and offer very localized amenities, we find that the relationship
between the share of surface devoted to green urban areas is a concave function of the
distance to the city center. On the one hand, the opportunity cost of land is too expensive
in the city center for the planner to implement many green areas there. On the other hand,
residents are too sparse at the city edges to give planners the incentives to invest in such
very localized amenities. We confirm our results using the European Environment Agency’s
Urban Atlas data on the land use of 305 EU cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. These
data describe land use and cover across Europe using harmonized Earth Observations (EOs),
which are combined with Eurostat Urban Audit statistical data. The data represent a unique
source of reliable and comparable European urban planning data. As far as we know, this
is the first paper that uses both a theoretical model and empirical estimation of European
urban land use. This result is robust to many variations of the land use specifications, city
structure specifications, and city and country characteristics.
We further estimate residential land use and use the estimated parameters to study the
value of green urban areas. To assess the value of green urban areas, we study counterfactual
exercises, where fifty percent of urban green areas are removed. We show that open cities lose
more than 6% of their population if those areas are left unused. The total loss for landlords
is approximately e150 million per city if green areas are not converted into residential land.
Converting those urban green areas into residential land, however, would increase residential
1See Ernstson (2012), Woo et al. (2009), Chiesura, A. (2004), IFPRA (2013)
2See Cohen at al. (2006, 2007) and Evenson et al. (2013)
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surfaces and increase the total housing market value by approximately e50 million. In closed
cities, residents lose utility, which can be restored by a subsidy of nearly one-tenth of their
net income. This exercise, based on a dramatic decline in green urban areas, suggests that
those areas provide highly valuable amenities to residents. Furthermore, our approach allows
us to quantify the impact of green areas across cities with various incomes and population
sizes and across locations within cities. To our knowledge, this paper is the first urban
economics contribution that quantifies the welfare value of green urban areas.
Our contribution relates to several strands of the economics literature. First, green urban
areas share the nature of a local public good. Since Tiebout (1956), economists have dis-
cussed the issue of resident mobility and democratic decision over local public goods (voting
with feet). Fujita (1986), Cremer et al. (1986) and Sakashita (1987) discuss the problem
of the optimal location of local public goods and find that local public goods should spread
to equidistant locations. Berliant et al. (2006) endogenize the public good provision and
location in cities where households have inelastic land use. Optimal public good providers
are found again to be equidistant and to serve basins of residents of the same size. Yet, in
contrast to this paper, those studies are conducted under the assumption of no land use in
the production of local public goods and/or no endogenous choice of residential land plots.
Because green urban areas are rather land-intensive, it is important to study how land use
affects public goods. Furthermore, the distribution of residents is not uniform across urban
landscapes and not exogenous to the local amenities given by green urban areas. This pa-
per focuses on the relationships between the endogenous distribution of residents and green
areas.
Finally, this paper links to the urban economics literature regarding the effect of open
spaces on urban form. Wu and Plantinga (2003) investigate the effect of an open space on
the surrounding urban structure. They, however, treat the location and size of this open
space as exogenous. Warziniack (2010) considers voting on the location of a single open space
when the geographical distribution of households is exogenous. Lee and Fujita (1997) and
Yang and Fujita (1999) examine the effect of a greenbelt, which has an exogenous location.
Yang and Fujita (1999) consider the effect of open spaces at the neighborhood level and
conclude that the equilibrium open space provision is uniform across the distance to the city
center. Such results contrast with our empirical analysis that shows that the share of green
urban areas is not constant across the city space. Our model with endogenous locations and
choices of residential space enables an explanation of this pattern.
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Parallel to our question is the issue of unoccupied urban spaces, which are often seen as
green areas. In contrast to green urban areas, open spaces are not maintained for human
activities. Unoccupied land has been primarily justified by the leapfrogging effect. Capoza
and Helsley (1990) and followers root this effect in the commitment of building decisions
and the resulting option value of urban land. Turner (2005) explains unoccupied land by the
negative externalities of dwellings in their direct neighborhoods. Walsh (2007) discusses and
estimates the protection and regulation of open spaces in Wake County (California, USA),
which expands the discussion beyond monocentric city frameworks. Caruso et al. (2007)
simulate market equilibria with discrete house slots and a fixed housing consumption, which
lead to open spaces. In contrast, our paper discusses a continuous model where households
decide their locations and slots and where open green areas are costly and planned as in many
EU cities. Urban green areas, such as parks or trees planted in rows, have maintenance and
land opportunity costs that are incurred by society.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model
and discusses the social optimal allocation of green urban areas and the decentralization
through the land market. Section 3 is devoted to our empirical approach and results. We
first provide evidence on the concave shape of the share of green urban areas, then estimate
residents’ land choice, and finally quantify the economic benefits of green urban areas. The
last section concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical model
We consider a circular monocentric city hosting a central business district (CBD) and a mass
N of individuals. We denote by b ∈ R+0 the distance between the CBD and the city border.
The population density is defined as the number of individuals in a unit of area at distance r
from the CBD and is denoted by the function n : [0, b]→ R+, which varies across the city. In
this paper we focus on green urban areas that are closely accessible to the local community
around its location. Green urban areas provide quick and frequent access to greenery, quiet,
children’s parks, socialization areas, etc. We consider the few blocks in the vicinity of a
green urban area as our unit of area or patch and model the urban area in a continuous
fashion. In a unit of area at distance r from the CBD, green urban areas offers a service
x : [0, b] → [0, x], x ∈ R+0 , to the local community living in the vicinity. This service brings
a level of amenity a = αx(r), although it necessitates the use of a fraction of land βx(r)
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and maintenance costs γx(r). The parameters α, β, γ ∈ R+ distinguish the amenity, land
use and maintenance factors that affect green urban areas. Hence, the fraction of land used
for residential purposes is given by 1− βx, and the maximum service level x is bounded by
1/β. We assume absentee landlords, and the outside opportunity value of land is given by
the agricultural land rent RA ∈ R+. For simplicity, we consider that rural areas beyond the
city border consist of private properties that do not provide green urban area service for city
dwellers (e.g., private crop fields, fenced areas, etc.). We denote the land supply at distance
r from the CBD by ` : [0, b]→ R+ (e.g., ` = 2pir if the city lies in a plain disk). In summary,
land at distance r from the CBD includes a surface βx(r)`(r) of maintained green urban
area and a residential area [1− βx(r)] `(r) , and it hosts n(r)`(r) residents who all benefit
from the green urban area amenity αx(r).
Individuals consume a quantity z of nonhousing composite goods and a quantity s of
residential space, while they benefit from the amenity a of a green urban area. They are
endowed with the utility function U(z, s, a), which is assumed to be concave and increasing
for each variable. We assume that demands for nonhousing composite goods, residential
space and amenity are gross substitutes such that U has negative second derivatives and
positive cross derivatives. As individuals are homogeneous, they work and earn the same
income w ∈ R+ in the CBD. Workers incur a total commuting cost t : [0, b] → R+ with
t(0) = 0 and dt/dr > 0. The price of composite good z is normalized to 1 without loss of
generality. From this point on and whenever there is no confusion, we dispense the functions
a, `, n, s, t, x, z and R with reference to distance r.
We first study the social optimal allocation and then the land market equilibrium.
2.1 Social Optimum
In an ideal world, green urban areas and residential structures should be combined to bal-
ance their social benefits and costs. Analysis of the social optimal structure of residential
and green urban areas provides urban planners with viable directions for urban planning.
Towards this aim, we assume a benevolent social planner who controls residential and green
urban plots across the city.
As in Herbert and Steven (1960), we assume that the planner desires to set the same
utility target u ∈ R for all urban residents.3 She (the planner) minimizes the cost in the
3This assumption avoids Mirrlees’s discussion of the unequal treatment of equals, has a close link to
competitive land equilibrium and yields first and second welfare theorems (Fujita 1989).
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city
C =
∫ b
0
(tn+ zn+RA + γx) `dr,
subject to the target constraint U (z, s, αx) = u and land use constraint sn = 1 − βx.
The total city population results from the accumulation of population density across the
city: N =
∫ b
0
n `dr. The planner chooses the profiles of consumption (z, s) and spatial
allocations (n, x) as well as the border b. Since wages w are exogenous, this is equivalent to
the maximization of total surplus S = wN − C. After substitution of the population and
land use constraints, this provides
S =
∫ b
0
[
w − t− z
s
(1− βx)−RA − γx
]
`dr. (1)
The planner then chooses the variables (z, s, x, b) that maximize S s.t. U ≥ u.
The optimal consumptions (z, s) are given by the pointwise maximization of (1), which
is equivalent to the set the maximum of the residential land value:
V ≡ max
z,s
w − t− z
s
s.t. U (z, s, a) ≥ u. (2)
Since the objective function in this expression decreases with z and U increases with it, the
constraint is binding. We denote the consumption z˜(s, a, u) as the solution of U(z, s, a) =
u. Because the utility function increases for all variables, we obtain z˜s = −Us/Uz < 0,
z˜a = −Ua/Uz < 0 and z˜u = 1/Uz > 0, while concavity of utility yields z˜ss > 0, where the
subscripts denote partial derivatives. Denoting an individual’s net income (net of commuting
cost) as
y ≡ w − t,
the problem simplifies to
V = max
s
y − z˜(s, a, u)
s
.
The optimal use of residential space is given by the solution of the following first-order
condition:
z˜(s, a, u)− sz˜s(s, a, u) = y.
Because z˜−sz˜s > 0 and (∂/∂s) (z˜ − sz˜s) = −sz˜ss < 0, this condition determines the optimal
residential space ŝ(y, a, u). We denote the optimal consumption of commodity goods by the
function ẑ(y, a, u) = z˜ [ŝ(y, a, u), a, u] and the optimal bid land value as V (y, a, u). Ceteris
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paribus, ŝ increases with decreasing y, and since z˜s < 0, ẑ increases with increasing y. By the
envelop theorem, the residential land value V rises with increasing y and a and decreasing
u.
The planner’s problem can then be rewritten as
max
x,b
S =
∫ b
0
[V (y, αx, u) (1− βx)−RA − γx] `dr. (3)
Pointwise differentiation w.r.t. x provides the necessary condition for green urban area
service,
αVa (1− βx)− βV − γ = 0, (4)
where V is evaluated at (y, αx, u). Using the land use constraint, we obtain the following
optimality condition:
αsnVa = βV + γ. (5)
This condition expresses the planner’s balance between the benefit of green area amenities
(LHS) and the costs of green urban land and its maintenance (RHS). Let x∗ (y, u) be the
optimal profile of the green urban area service. Note that x∗ never reaches its upper bound
x = 1/β. If it did, the population density n would fall to zero, and green urban areas would
lead to maintenance and land costs but no amenities (zero LHS in (5)). It can nevertheless
be that x∗ = 0 if the LHS is smaller than the RHS for all x ∈ [0, 1/β). In summary,
x∗ ∈ [0, 1/β). For the sake of conciseness, we assume in this section that the second-order
condition holds and concentrate our discussion on interior solutions.4
Interestingly, expression (5) can be recovered as Samuelson’s optimality condition of
public goods after some mathematical transformations (see Appendix A):
α
Ua
Uz
n = β
Us
Uz
+ γ (6)
where Ua/Uz is the marginal rate of substitution between commodities and amenities and
Us/Uz that between commodities and residential spaces. The Samuelson’s optimality condi-
tion states that the sum of marginal rates of substitution for green area amenities equates
the maintenance cost γ plus the marginal rate of substitution for residential land. This last
element is novel in the context of public goods theory. In our context, it applies at the level
4The second-order condition is given by α2Vaa (1− βx)− (1 + α)βVa < 0. This condition holds provided
that V̂aa < 0.
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of the patch because externalities are localized at this level. A green urban area is a local
public good because its amenities equally benefit the residents localized in its patch, which
has a population density n. The same local park indeed serves many residents. Green urban
areas differ from usual (spaceless) local public goods in their land intensity. This has an
impact on locations with lower usage of residential spaces because low space consumption
is usually associated with higher marginal rates of substitution for space Us/Uz. To our
knowledge, this tradeoff has not been highlighted in the literature.
Fixing the variables z, s and n, we observe that a lower amenity parameter α, higher
land use parameter β and higher maintenance cost parameter γ entice the planner to reduce
the green urban area service x and also its land area αx. We also distinguish between the
effects of population density and use of space. On the one hand, areas with low population
density should accommodate smaller shares of green urban areas because they benefit fewer
people. On the other hand, areas with small residential plots imply high marginal rates of
substitution for space and should also be provisioned with smaller shares of green urban
areas. In general, population density is low at the city edges, and residential plots are small
near CBDs. Hence, the planner is enticed to set smaller shares of green urban areas at the
city edges and CBDs and larger shares in intermediate locations, which is the idea that we
will explore in the empirical section.
2.2 Comparative statics
Comparative statics on the service of green urban areas can be obtained by totally differen-
tiating (4). Noting that Va > 0, it is easy to see that
dx∗
dβ
,
dx∗
dγ
< 0,
such that land and maintenance costs have negative impacts on the service of green urban
areas to residents. Other comparative statics are ambiguous as
dx∗
dα
> 0 ⇐⇒ ((1 + αVaa) (1− βx∗)− βVa)x∗ > 0,
dx∗
dy
< 0 ⇐⇒ αVay (1− βx∗)− βVy < 0,
dx∗
du
< 0 ⇐⇒ αVau (1− βx∗)− βVu < 0.
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First, the effect of the amenity parameter is ambiguous. It can be shown from the first
expression that when green urban area services provide very few amenities and use small land
pieces (α, β → 0), the optimal service x∗ and surface βx∗ rise with the amenity parameter
α. In fact, at very low levels, a higher α gives the planner incentives to raise service x∗
because the parameter raises the effectiveness of the service. However, at high levels, a
higher parameter α substitutes for service level x and entices the planner to reduce it.
Net income y is given by a worker’s wage minus his/her commuting cost, which increases
with distance to the CBD. Therefore, comparative statics on y highlight the effect of distance
to the CBD. The effect of net income can be deduced from the second expression as follows:
dx∗
dy
> 0 ⇐⇒ αn∗ d
d ln y
(
Ua
Uz
)
+ αn∗
Ua
Uz
d lnŝ
d ln y
− β d
d ln y
(
Us
Uz
)
> 0. (7)
The effect of higher net income on green area services depends on three factors: first, on the
income elasticity of demand for residential spaces d lnŝ/d ln y; second, on the marginal rates
of substitution between commodities and green urban areas Ua/Uz; and finally on the reaction
of those marginal rates to increases in income (d/d ln y) (Ua/Uz) and (d/d ln y) (Us/Uz). The
latter reactions are related to the Engel curves in spaces (z, s) and (z, a). It can be shown
that the marginal rate of substitution rises (falls) with income in those spaces if the Engel
curves rise and bend upward (downward). In other words, higher income raises more demand
for residential spaces s and amenities a than demand for commodities z. As a result, the
effect of net income on green urban area services depends on the balance between the income
effects on the demands for amenities and space. If income effects are identical (as will be
the case below under the Cobb-Douglas preferences), the marginal rates of substitution are
invariant to income, and the above inequality holds for all net incomes. The optimal green
urban area service then rises with net income. As a result, this optimal service also rises
with wages and falls with distance from the CBD. In the end, the relative importance of
each income effect is still an empirical issue for which we have found no information in the
literature.
A similar comparative exercise can be performed on the impact of utility target u. One
simply substitutes y for u in condition (7). The effect of target utility therefore depends on
how it affects the use of residential space and the above marginal rates of substitution.
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2.3 City border and population
Finally, the planner sets the city border so that the first-order condition w.r.t. b,
V (y, αx∗, u) (1− βx∗)− γx∗ = RA, (8)
holds, where y and x∗ are evaluated at r = b. Since x∗ maximizes the LHS, the latter should
be no smaller than V (y, 0, u). A sufficient condition for an optimal border b∗ (u) is that the
LHS lies above zero at r = 0 and decreases for increasing r. That is,
V (w, 0, u) ≥ RA, (9)(
−Vy dt
dr
+ αVa
)
(1− βx) < βV + γ for r ∈ [0, b∗], (10)
where the second line is evaluated at (y, αx∗, u). We assume that these conditions hold.
Comparative statics can be obtained by totally differentiating (8). Since (8) decreases with
x, the optimal border b∗ increases with the parameters that increase the value of the LHS
of (8) and reduce its RHS. Recalling that Vy, Va > 0 > Vu and y = w − t, it follows that
db∗
dβ
,
db∗
dγ
,
db∗
du
,
db∗
dRA
< 0 <
db∗
dα
,
db∗
dw
. (11)
Hence, As in the literature, cities also expand with higher wages and cities spread when
green urban areas provide higher amenities, use smaller pieces of land and require lower
maintenance costs.shrink with higher agricultural rent and utility costs.
The city population is given by N =
∫ b∗(u)
0
[1− βx∗ (y, u)] /ŝ(y, αx∗, u) `dr, with y =
w − t. Finally, the total surplus is given by
S∗(u) =
∫ b∗(u)
0
[V (y, αx∗, u) (1− βx∗ (y, u))−RA − γx∗ (y, u)] `dr. (12)
Therefore, by the envelop theorem, the change in surplus is given by S∗u(u) =
∫ b∗(u)
0
Vu
(1− βx∗) `dr, which is negative since Vu < 0. Higher utility targets u reduce the city
surplus.
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2.4 Regulation and Henry George theorem
We are now equipped to discuss the impact of migration restriction and land regulation
in cities. In practice, utility targets are determined by city planners (city officials and
representatives) through their land regulation and migration policies. On the one hand, a
city planner may opt for unrestricted migration so that u is determined by the outside utility
level, e.g., u ∈ R. The population densities and levels adapt to migration pressure, and the
city generates a surplus S∗(u), which we assume to be positive (otherwise, the planner has
no incentive to create the city without external funding). On the other hand, a city planner
may opt to restrict land use and population as to maximize incumbent residents’ utility.
Then, he/she targets the highest possible utility subject that is compatible with a positive
surplus: S∗(u) ≥ 0. As the surplus decreases with increasing u, the highest utility, say u∗, is
reached for a zero surplus: S∗(u∗) = 0. In this case, green urban areas can be self-financed
by land value. Indeed, S∗(u∗) = 0 can be written as
∫ b∗(u∗)
0
(1− βx∗) (V −RA) `dr =
∫ b∗(u)
0
x∗ (γ + βRA) `dr,
which shows an exact balance between the aggregate differential residential land value
(V −RA) and the land and maintenance costs of green urban areas (the functions V and x∗
being evaluated at (y, αx∗, u∗)). This balance is a reminiscence of the Henry George theorem,
by which a confiscatory tax on land would by itself finance a city’s public goods, provided
that the city reaches the size that maximizes residents’ utility. This paper adds two new
elements to the standard version of this theorem: optimal green urban areas, first, are very
localized public goods that provide unequal amenities and, second, require uneven land areas
through the city.
It must be emphasized that self-financing takes place at the city level and not at the patch
level. There indeed exist cross-subsidies across urban dwellers. Indeed, at any distance r
from the CBD, residents create a value V of their residential land, while they generate a
green urban area maintenance cost γx and a land opportunity cost RA on the patch. This
approach yields a resident’s net value equal to S ≡ V (1− βx) − RA − γx, which is the
integrand of (3). Using the first-order condition (4), one readily obtains that dS/dr =
Vydy/dr = −Vydt/dr < 0. Hence, a resident’s net value falls with increasing distance from
the CBD. When the city management maximizes residents’ utility and imposes a zero surplus
such that S∗ = ∫ b∗
0
S `dr = 0, it is clear that residents close to the city center bring positive
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net values, while those away from it bring negative values. Hence, the central population
subsidizes the green urban areas at urban edges.
2.5 Competitive land market equilibrium
In most modern cities, residents freely choose their residential locations and spaces. They
make their decisions according to the land rent values signaled in the urban land market.
We here discuss the equilibrium allocations in a competitive land market for an exogenous
profile of green urban services x : [0, b] → [0, 1/β) and amenities a = αx. A household’s
budget constraint is given by z+ sR+ t ≤ w, where R : [0, b]→ R+ is the land rent function
of distance to the CBD.
In a competitive land market equilibrium, each land slot is awarded to the highest bidder,
and individuals have no incentives to relocate within and out of a city. Therefore, they reach
the same utility level ue, where the superscript e refers to the equilibrium value. Households
bid up to (w− z − t)/s for each unit of residential space. Their bid rent ψ : [0, b]→ R+ is a
function of distance r from the CBD such that
ψ = max
s,z
y − z
s
s.t. U(z, s, a) ≥ ue, (13)
where net income y = w − t is a function of distance to the CBD. As individuals compete
for land, they raise their bids to make their participation constraint binding and obtain the
equilibrium utility level ue. Note that (13) is equivalent to the social optimal consumption
choice (2). Therefore, households’ optimal consumptions are given by the functions ŝ(y, a, ue)
and ẑ(y, a, ue), and the bid rent, by ψ̂(y, a, ue) = V (y, a, ue). The bid rent inherits the
properties of V . That is, ψ̂y, ψ̂a > 0, while ψ̂u < 0.
A competitive land market equilibrium is defined as the set of functions (z, s, R, n) and
scalars (b,N, ue) satisfying the following four conditions. First, individuals choose their op-
timal consumptions: z = ẑ(y, a, ue) and s = ŝ(y, a, ue). Second, land is allocated to the
highest bidder: R = max{ψ̂(y, a, ue), RA}, with R = ψ̂(y, a, ue) if n > 0, and R = RA if
n = 0. Third, the land market clears everywhere: nŝ(y, a, ue) = (1−g) if n > 0. Finally, the
total population conforms to its density: N =
∫ b
0
n 2pirdr. Here, N is taken as exogenous in
a closed city model, while ue is exogenous in an open city.
Within a city, equilibrium land rents are given by the winning bids such that R =
ψ̂(y, a, ue). Since bid rents ψ increase with net income y and amenities a, the equilibrium
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land rent R falls with distance from the CBD but rises with the proportion of green urban
area. Importantly, at the social optimal amenity a and utility level u, consumptions in a
competitive land market match the social optimal ones exactly, while land bid rents ψ and
land rents R match social land values V . This finding is reminiscent of the social optimum
property in Herbert and Steven’s (1960) model, where competitive land market equilibria
are socially optimal. The land market is then allowed to decentralize the choices of land and
commodity consumption. However, this applies only if green urban areas are optimally set
in our framework.
In equilibrium, land rents must exceed RA for any location r ∈ [0, b) and be equal to it
at the equilibrium city border be. To simplify the exposition, we assume that Re(r) crosses
RA from above at r = b
e, which occurs if ψ̂(y, a, ue) lies above RA in the CBD and falls in
r. A sufficient condition is given by
ψ̂(w, 0, ue) > RA,
−ψ̂y dt
dr
+ αψ̂a
dx
dr
< 0.
Given that ψ̂ = V , these conditions compare to the social optimal ones, (9) and (10), except
that they do not include the land and maintenance costs of green urban areas. Residents do
not consider those costs in a competitive equilibrium. After some reshuﬄing, this gives
w > ẑ(w, 0, ue) +RAŝ(w, 0, u
e), (14)
dt
dr
> −αz˜adx
dr
. (15)
These sufficient conditions imply that urban productivity is sufficiently high for a city to
exist in the absence of green urban areas and that green urban areas do not have too steep
density profiles or do not yield too much spatial variation in amenities. Sufficiently high
wages w and a low amenity parameter α guarantee these conditions. Under conditions (14)
and (15), a spatial equilibrium exists. The equilibrium city border be is given by the unique
solution of the land arbitrage condition: R(be) = RA. This border coincides with the social
optimal one since R = ψ̂ = V .
The equilibrium population density is equal to ne = (1 − g)/ŝ(y, a, ue) ≥ 0, while the
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equilibrium population aggregates the population density across the urban area as
N e =
∫ be
0
1− βx
ŝ(y, a, ue)
2pirdr.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 1 Suppose that conditions (14) and (15) hold. Then, a competitive land market
equilibrium exists and is unique. Furthermore, the land and commodity consumption in the
competitive land market equilibrium and social optimum coincide if green urban areas are
provided at the socially optimal levels and if utility levels u and ue match.
A competitive land market is a powerful mechanism to decentralize consumption deci-
sions. It can be checked that land tax does not affect goods and land consumption choices;
thus, land taxes may be used by city planners to finance green urban areas.
To obtain more analytical results, we focus on a narrower class of Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ences.
2.6 Cobb-Douglas preferences
We define our workhorse model with the Cobb-Douglas utility
U = z1−φ−ϕsφeaϕ
with φ, ϕ, (1− φ− ϕ) ∈ (0, 1). We compute z˜ = (us−φe−aϕ) 11−φ−ϕ , which gives
ẑ =
1− ϕ− φ
1− ϕ y, (16)
ŝ =
(
1− ϕ
1− ϕ− φ
) 1−ϕ−φ
φ (
uy−(1− ϕ− φ)e−aϕ
) 1
φ , (17)
V = κ−1
(
uy−(1− ϕ)e−aϕ
)− 1
φ (18)
where κ = (1− ϕ) 1− ϕφ (1− ϕ− φ)− 1−ϕ−φφ . Condition (6) becomes
e
αϕ
φ
x (αϕ− βφ− βαϕx) = κγy− 1−ϕφ u 1φ . (19)
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As shown in Appendix A, there exists a unique interior optimal service level x∗ > 0 if the
green area amenities per surface unit are sufficiently large α/β > φ/ϕ, the maintenance cost
γ is sufficiently low and the net income y is sufficiently high. Otherwise, there is a corner
solution x∗ = 0.
It is also shown that for any interior solution x∗,
dx∗
dy
> 0 and
d2x∗
dy2
< 0.
Hence, since y = w − t(r), the optimal share of green urban areas g∗ = βx∗ increases with
wage w and decreases with distance from the CBD r. The optimal share is also a concave
function of wage and distance from the CBD. Finally, since ŝ falls in y and a and because
a = αx∗ increases with y, ŝ(y, αx∗, u) also falls with the latter. Then, the population density
increases with higher wages and falls with longer distances to the CBD.
Proposition 2 Under the Cobb-Douglas preferences, population density is a decreasing func-
tion of distance from the CBD, while the share of green urban areas is a decreasing and
concave function of this distance.
The monotonicity of the share of green urban areas is specific to the Cobb-Douglas pref-
erence. It can be shown that the share of green urban areas increases and then decreases with
distance from the city center if one assumes Polak preferences, e.g., U = z(1−ϕ−φ) (s− s0)φ aϕ,
where s0 > 0 is an individual’s minimum use of residential space; this is also a concave func-
tion under hyperbolic preferences of the form U = a+z−1/s.5 Thus, as our main theoretical
prediction, we retain the fact that the share of green urban areas is a concave function of
the distance from the CBD.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we compare the model prediction to the actual green urban patterns in
European cities.
5See Supplementary Appendix, available on request.
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3.1 Data
In this paper, we use the dataset on urban land use from the Urban Atlas 2006, implemented
by the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) service and provided by
the European Environment Agency (EEA), for the time period 2005-2007. The dataset offers
a high-resolution map of land use in European urban areas, containing information derived
from Earth observations and backed by other reference data, such as navigation data and
topographic maps. The Urban Atlas uses Earth observation satellite images with 2.5 m
spatial resolution.6 According to the GMES, the dataset covers the functional urban areas
(FUAs) of the EU cities with at least 100,000 inhabitants.7 FUAs include land with both
commuting distance and time below the critical levels defined by Eurostat.8 The dataset
includes all capital cities and covers nearly 300 of the most populous towns and cities in
Europe (EU 27).9 Figure 1 displays the urban areas covered by these cities.
The Urban Atlas provides a classification of city zones that allows for a comparison of
the density of residential areas, commercial and industrial zones and extent of green areas.
In this paper, we use the data on ”green urban areas” (class 14100), which are defined as
artificial nonagricultural vegetated areas. They consist of areas with planted vegetation that
is regularly worked and/or strongly influenced by humans. More precisely, first, green urban
areas include public green areas used predominantly for recreational use (gardens, zoos,
parks, castle parks, cemeteries, etc.). Second, suburban natural areas that have become and
are managed as urban parks are included as green urban areas. Finally, green urban areas
also include forest and green areas that extend from the surroundings into urban areas with
at least two sides being bordered by urban areas and structures and containing visible traces
of recreational use. Importantly, for our study, green urban areas do not include private
gardens within housing areas, buildings within parks, such as castles or museums, patches of
natural vegetation or agricultural areas enclosed by built-up areas without being managed as
green urban areas. It must be noted that green urban areas belong to the Urban Atlas’ class
of ”artificial surfaces”, which include all nonagricultural land devoted to human activities.10
6GMES maps have a 100 times higher resolution than traditional maps in the Corine Land Cover inventory
produced since 1990.
7See the definition in the Urban Audit database and European Environmental Agency, GMES Urban
Atlas Metadata. Link: https://land.copernicus.eu/local/urban-atlas (accessed on Jan 25, 2018).
8See the definition in the Urban Audit in EEA, 2015, and the details in Appendix B.
9Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
10In addition to green urban areas, artificial surfaces include urban areas with dominant residential use,
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Figure 1: GMES 2006 maps
This class is distinguished from the agricultural, seminatural areas and wetlands, forest areas
and water areas devoted to nonurban activities.
We select the (oldest) town hall locations as the CBDs. Then, we create a set of annuli
(rings) around each CBD at 100 m intervals. We define the ”annulus land area” as the
intersection of the annulus and the land within the urban zone area reported by the GMES.
This area includes artificial surfaces, agriculture, seminatural areas, wetlands and forest but
does not include water areas because those seas and oceans are not appropriate for potential
human dwellings. We then compute the share of green urban area as the ratio of the surface
of green urban area to the total land in the annulus land area for each annulus . Figure 2
displays the annuli and the land use of green urban areas (green color) for Dublin.
Whereas urban theoretical models usually assume a neat frontier between residential
innercity areas with central business district and residential use, industrial, commercial, public, military and
private units, transport units, mines, dump and construction sites, and sports and leisure facilities.
17
Figure 2: Dublin Land Use maps
and nonresidential spaces, urban data do not provide a clear separation between residential
locations and agricultural areas and forests. In this paper, we choose to fix the city borders
to the annulus for which the ratio of residential surfaces over the annulus land area falls
below 20%. Residential surfaces include urban areas with dominant residential use and
innercity areas with central business district and residential use. They are shown in red in
Figure 2. As shown in the sequel and Appendix B, the use of other thresholds does not lead
to qualitative differences in our empirical results. We define the distance from the CBD,
dist, as the distance from the CBD of the annulus and the relative distance, rdist, as this
distance from the CBD divided by the distance between the CBD and the city border. We
also include several controls that do not depend on the relative distance to the CBD. A
country dummy vector accounts for a country’s specific urban regulations and wealth. We
also divide the sample into three city groups: small cities, with a population below a half
million; medium-sized cities, with a population between a half and one million; and large
18
Figure 3: Dublin Green Urban Space
cities, with a population exceeding one million. The dummy vector city size includes the
fixed effect on each city group.
In addition to the GMES, we use the population density from the European population
grid.11 We calculate the population mass at each distance to the city center and redistribute
the population to the residential area in each annulus.12 Because the Eurostat population
grid does not cover Cyprus, we exclude Lefkosia, Cyrus. For the income level of a city, we
use the household net income at the NUTS2 level, as reported in the Eurostat’s Regional
Economic Accounts, which provides the finest detail on household net income. Our results
are robust to the use of city’s per capita GDP at the NUTS3 level.13 Other measures of cities’
11For more information on the European population grid, please check the technical report of the GEO-
STAT 1A project from Eurostat. Link: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4311134/4350174/ESSnet-
project-GEOSTAT1A-final-report 0.pdf/fc048569-bc1c-4d99-9597-0ea0716efac3 (Accessed on May 30, 2018).
12Residential areas are called ’urban fabrics’ in the GMES.
13See Supplementary Material.
19
exogenous geographical characteristics are taken from the E-OBS database.14 We control
for these exogenous geographical characteristics because they may affect residential choices.
We finally measure the city populations as the number (millions) of inhabitants living in
the city and greater city (CGC) areas, as defined and reported in the Eurostat databases.15
Table 1 presents the summary statistics.
14The E-OBS database provides detailed data on the daily temperature, daily precipitation, sea
level pressure and elevation across Europe. We acknowledge the E-OBS dataset from the EU-FP6
project ENSEMBLES (http://ensembles-eu.metoffice.com) and the data providers in the ECA&D project
(http://www.ecad.eu).
15For more details, see metadata files for urb esms in the Urban Audit database of the Eurostat website.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
average sd min max observations
City border (km) 4.3 3.2 1.0 24.0 305
City area (km2) 84 174 1 1809 305
Number of annuli 43 32 10 240 305
Population in FUA (millions) 0.79 1.29 0.06 12.10 301
Population in CGC (millions): all cities 0.44 0.79 0.03 8.17 305
small cities 0.20 0.11 0.03 0.50 240
medium sized cities 0.64 0.13 0.51 0.98 36
large cities 2.25 1.66 1.01 8.17 29
Total share of green urban area in city (UGS) (%) 6.5 4.3 0.6 42.6 305
Highest share of UGS (%) 19.2 8.8 2.4 70.0 305
Highest share of UGS (%) (kernel smoothing) 9.5 5.0 0.4 42.2 305
Distance of highest share of UGS (km) 1.3 1.5 0.1 15.8 305
Distance of highest share of UGS (km) (kernel smoothing) 1.7 1.8 0.1 15.5 305
GDP per capita (e1000/hab.) 26.88 13.06 6.00 83.70 305
Household income (e1000/hab.) 15.46 5.63 3.70 30.90 304
Density (hab./100m2) 0.44 0.28 0.10 1.96 303
Residential Space (100m2) 0.98 0.44 0.21 2.47 304
City Geographical Controls
Elevation (m) 212 210 −2 1,614 305
Average temperature at Jan 01 (oC) 2.30 4.62 −8.48 15.57 305
Average temperature at July 01 (oC) 19.18 12.27 12.27 28.70 305
Average daily precipitation (mm/day) 1.91 0.60 0.48 4.45 305
Share of Urban Green Land (%) 304 6.57 4.38 0.62 42.69
Share of Residential Land (%) 304 34.03 4.99 12.85 47.42
Share of Industrial and Public Land (%) 304 16.61 6.02 2.26 47.57
Share of Sport and Leisure Land (%) 304 3.76 3.21 0.00 12.79
Share of Forest Land (%) 304 5.14 6.23 0.00 32.57
Share of Agricultural Land (%) 304 16.29 10.75 0.00 52.13
Share of Forest Land within 100m buffer (%) 304 1.43 2.04 0.00 13.42
Share of Agricultural Land within 100m buffer (%) 304 6.15 5.66 0.00 33.19
Note: The GMES database released on May 2010 reports only 301 FUAs for the time period 2005-2007. Cities without FUAs
reporting are Wrexham and Derry (UK), and Gozo (Malta). Aix-en-Provence shares the same FUA as Marseille. We use the
Nadaraya-Watson Gaussian Kernel to smooth variations of annuli values.16 GDP per inhabitants and Household income are
taken from Regional Economic Accounts from Eurostat at NUTS3 and NUTS2 level respectively. Note that in Eurostat
database, household income level exists only at NUTS2 level. In eurostat database for household income at NUTS2, there is
no data for Luxembourg (NUTS2 code LU00); therefore, there is only 304 cities instead of 305 cities. The number of
inhabitants in each annuli is calculated based on Eurostat Population Grid. As Eurostat Population Grid 2006 does not cover
Cyrus; hence, we also drop the city cy001l lefkosia in our database. The total number of annuli are calculated for 303 cities
excluding lu001l luxembourg and cy001l lefkosia. For city geographical controls, we take into account the average for period
1995-2010 for each city.
16The Nadaraya-Watson estimate is given by [Σni=1K(x− xi)gi] / [Σni=1K(x− xi)] where K(x) =(√
2pih
)−1
exp(−x2/2h2). Here, we choose bandwidth h = 2 (km). More details, see Hansen (2009).
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On average, green urban areas account for nearly 6% of the total surface of city areas.
Cities have a rather heterogeneous share of green urban areas. Figure 4 displays a histogram
of the shares of green urban areas across the studied cities. There is a large dispersion in
the average green urban areas across EU cities. In Figure 4, the city with lowest share of
green urban area (0.62%) is Limerick, Ireland, and the one with the highest share (42.6%) is
Karlovy Vary, Czech Republic. The latter is a spa resort city, which offers many green areas
to its visitors. The former city includes few land surfaces classified as green urban areas
because it also has many agricultural and seminatural lands that can be used for urban
green amenities. These outliers do not affect our results. Spots with the highest densities of
urban green areas are located, on average, at 1.3− 1.7 kilometers from the CBD.
In this paper, we mostly use the household income that measures the per capita income
net of all income taxes and at the NUTS2 level. Household incomes vary greatly across
EU cities, from e3,700 per inhabitant to e30,900 per inhabitant. The average income is
e15,460. Household income represents a bit more than one-half of the per capita production
value (NUTS3), which reflects the high tax wedge between production cost and net income
in the EU. City elevation also varies greatly, from two meters below sea level in Amsterdam,
Netherlands, to 1, 614 meters above sea level in the mountainous city of Innsbruck, Aus-
tria. European cities belong to a mild climate zone, with temperatures varying between −8
and +28 degrees Celsius at the lowest and highest day temperature in winter and summer
(measured on January 1 and July 1, respectively, for the period 1995-2000).17 The average
population density is approximately 4,400 inhabitants per square kilometer and ranges from
1,000 to 9,800 inhabitants per square kilometer. These numbers are reasonable because the
database concentrates on the core of urban areas with no agricultural or seminatural land
use.
3.2 Urban green area profiles
In this subsection, we compare our theoretical predictions with the empirical properties
of green urban areas in EU cities. According to the theoretical model, the social optimal
land share devoted to green urban areas is a concave and possibly nonmonotonic function
of distance to the CBD; it first increases and then decreases as one moves away from the
17We use observations from the E-OBS databases from the EU-FP6 project (for details, see the references).
Our samples do not contain some northern European cities in Iceland and Norway.
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Figure 4: Average Share of Green Urban Space Distribution
CBD. This pattern reflects the tradeoff between the high land values in the center, which
make green urban areas too costly, and the too sparse population in the periphery, which
associates green urban areas with too low social benefits. The aim of this subsection is to test
the concavity of the land share of green areas in the studied European cities. In addition,
we test whether this share is nil at the CBD. We propose the following reduced form model:
gijc = η1 rdistijc + η2 rdist
2
ijc + η3 rdist
3
ijc +Xj + ijc, (20)
where gijc is the land share of green urban areas in annulus i (ranked according to distance
to the CBD) of city j in country c. We study both quadratic and cubic models, where the
coefficient η3 is constrained to zero in the first case. To allow for comparison across cities,
we define the covariate of the relative distance of an annulus rdistijc and add the city fixed
effects Xj as controls. Urban green areas are likely to lie on adjacent annuli such that green
urban area densities may not be independent observations, which biases the estimation. Ad-
ditionally, more distant annuli aggregate more surface; thus, the estimation may suffer from
heteroskedasticity. Hence, we report the Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent estimation
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of the standard residual errors. Table 2 presents the results from the regression of equation
(20).
Table 2 reports a negative and significant correlation with the square of the distance
to the CBD, which suggests that the hypothesis of a concave profile for the share of green
urban areas g should not be rejected. Columns (1) to (3) report the results with and
without country and city controls. As can be seen, these controls do not have a large
effect on the amplitude and significance of results. Columns (4) to (6) present the results
for the subsamples of small cities (population below a half million), medium-sized cities
(population between a half and one million) and large cities (population exceeding one
million), respectively. The signs are not altered, which corroborates the idea of concave
profiles. A formal testing of concavity requires an examination of the p-value of a one-sided
t-test of the respective coefficients. In Appendix B, we show that the p-values are very low;
thus, the joint hypothesis of η1 > 0 and η2 < 0 cannot be rejected at the 99% confidence.
We also show that the results are robust to various observation weightings, which suggests
that misspecification issues can be excluded.
Columns (4) to (6) also show that the (absolute values of) amplitudes of the coefficients
increase with city size. The shares of green urban areas reach higher levels in larger cities.
Indeed, we can compute the average shares of green urban areas in the CBD (rdist = 0),
at its peak location (rdist = −η1/ (2η2)) and at the city border (rdist = 1). The average
shares of green urban areas in the CBD are given by the intercepts of the regression models,
which are computed as the following averages of the city fixed effects in Columns (4) to
(6): 0.067∗∗∗, 0.059∗∗∗, and 0.058∗∗∗. With this information, we deduce that, on average, the
shares of green urban areas in small cities (Column (4)) rise from 6.7%, peak at 7.7% at
rdist = 33% of the border and fall back to 3.6% at the city border. The shares in medium-
sized cities (Column (5)) rise from 5.9%, peak at 9.0% at 46% of the border and fall back
to 4.6%. Finally, large cities (Column (6)) have shares that rise from 5.8%, reach their
peaks at 9.9% at 45% of the border and fall back to 3.7%. Finally, since the share of green
urban areas over an entire city is given by
∫ 1
0
(η0 + η1ξ + η2ξ
2) dξ = η0 +
1
2
η1 +
1
3
η2, we can
compute the average shares to be 6.7%, 7.7% and 8.1% for small, medium-sized and large
cities, respectively.
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Our model predicts a concave profile for the share of green urban areas rather than the
quadratic profile in Columns (1) to (6). Columns (7) to (9) present the same regression
analysis as in Columns (1) to (3) for a cubic regression model. One can observe that the
coefficients are significantly different from zero. The results suggest a hump-shaped profile
for the share of green urban areas, with the coefficients for the square of distance being
significantly negative. In this cubic model, local concavity is given by the sign of the second
derivative g′′ = 2η2 +6η3×rdist, with rdist ∈ [0, 1]. Since η2 is negative in Table 2, the share
of green urban areas is certainly a concave function in areas sufficiently close to the CBD.
However, because η3 is positive in Table 2, concavity fails at greater distances from the CBD.
Using the results in Column (9), the convexity coefficient is equal to g′′(0) = 2η2 = −1. 182
in the CBD and g′′(1) = 2η2 + 6η3 = 0.630 at the city edge. Hence, the profiles are
increasing and concave near the CBD but convex at city edges. However, such convexity is
not inconsistent with our theory because the share of green urban areas must have convex
kinks when reaching zero. Finally, using Column (9), the share of green urban areas reaches
a maximal value at 33% of the distance between the CBD and city border (solution of
g′ = η1 + 2η2 × rdist+ 3η3 × rdist2 = 0).
We run a series of robustness checks, and the results are presented in Table 3. We study
variations around the setup of Column (3) in Table 2, with both city and country fixed effects.
First, as Figure 3 shows, there exists substantial serial correlation in the share of green
urban areas, which questions the assumption of homoskedatisticity. Column (1) presents
similar results under OLS without correction for heteroskedasticity and therefore suggests
that heteroskedasiticy is not an important issue. Second, we check issues of truncation and
size observation units. The surface areas of the annuli rise linearly with distance to their
center. Therefore, the annuli about a CBD measure green urban areas within smaller surfaces
and may have much more variability, as would be the case if an identically sized park were
randomly dropped on the annuli. Furthermore, small-surface annuli are supposed to include
the true city center but may miss this objective if true city centers are slightly away from
the city hall locations used as the city centers. The observed share of green urban areas
close to CBDs can then be more volatile and biased. To check for this issue, we aggregate
the three most central 100-meter annuli into one larger central ring and the next two annuli
in another ring, while we leave the other annuli intact. The results are presented in Column
(2) and do not qualitatively differ from the baseline model. In Column (3), we also include
the robustness check for urban green profiles, where all large parks are excluded. Since our
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model focuses on the effect of local urban green areas within a neighborhood, it might not
apply to very large parks that have global effects on city inhabitants. Therefore, we further
exclude all the parks exceeding one square kilometer,18 and the regression results do not
significantly different from our baseline regression.
18We also checked other criteria for this size threshold for large parks in our model, such as the 99th
percentile level; however, the results were rather similar. For more details, please check the Supplementary
Materials.
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Third, in Table 2, city borders have been defined by the locations where the share of
residential space reaches a threshold of 20%. This definition resulted from our tradeoff
between theory and data. In theory, a city border is well defined and has a zero residential
density, although it is not well defined in the data where the residential density never reaches
zero. The use of a threshold that is too high certainly undershoots the actual distances
between the CBD and city borders. Therefore, we extend the definition of a city border
with a lower threshold of 15%. This extension is shown in Column (4), where the number
of observations rises to 16,851 annuli. The results remain qualitatively the same. However,
for this threshold value, the random variations in the share of residential spaces lead to
fluctuations and downward biases in city border values. Column (5) displays the results
obtained when the share of residential spaces is smoothed (with the same kernel smoothing as
in Table 1). The number of observed annuli rises to 22,549. The results remain qualitatively
the same, except for the coefficient of the linear distance term, which becomes not significant.
This result reflects a decrease in the slope of the measured share of green urban areas and is
explained by the fact that Column (5) includes new observations with no green urban areas.
These new observations with zeros at far distance from the CBD reduce the slope of the
share of green urban areas.
Fourth, the dataset may not match the monocentric city hypothesis of the theoretical
model because it includes polycentric cities and contiguous cities. The next columns of Table
3 reduce this mismatch. Column (6) reports results for the set of 27 small and medium-sized
EU cities with populations less than 1 million individuals (keeping fixed country effects). This
approach eliminates the largest cities that are prone to host multiple subcenters. Column (7)
focuses on monocentric cities using the OECD study on metropolitan urban polycentricity,
keeps the 21 countries that are common to our GMES database and excludes reported
polycentric cities (see Appendix B for details). Similarly, in our theory, cities are spatially
separated, which is not always the case in the data. Columns (8) and (9) report results with
the subsamples of cities that are at least 50 km and 100 km apart, respectively, keeping fixed
country effects. The first distance usually corresponds to the extent of urban labor market
areas. The second distance makes sure that daily commuting between cities is unattractive.
As can be seen in Table 3, Columns (6) to (9) do not qualitatively deviate from the baseline
results.
One may question to which land functionality green urban areas should be compared. Our
theoretical model discusses the split between green urban areas and residential land. In the
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above empirical model, we have extended the areas for residential functionality to all human
dwellers’ functionalities. Accordingly, our above baseline empirical analysis used a measure
of the share of green urban areas consisting of the ratio of the area of green urban areas
as the numerator and the area of artificial surfaces, agriculture, seminatural areas, wetlands
and forest as the denominator. Therefore, the denominator includes many potential land
functions. The last columns of Table 3 present the results on alternative measures for this
denominator, which increasingly narrow the comparison down to residential areas. Column
(10) displays the share of green urban areas when we keep only the artificial surfaces in
this denominator. This approach eliminates agricultural areas, wetlands and forests. Next,
we compare green urban areas to the land used exclusively for human activities. Column
(11) reports the results with the denominator measuring the land for residences, offices and
green urban areas (i.e., urban fabrics, industrial, commercial, public, military and private
units and green urban areas). This approach eliminates roads, railways, ports, airports,
mines, construction sites, land with no use and sports and leisure facilities. Finally, Column
(12) is even more restrictive by concentrating on only urban fabrics and green urban areas.
The regression coefficients remain stable despite important variations in the definition of the
share of green urban areas.
Finally, we run the regression (20) for each city in our sample and count the number
of cities for which the concavity property holds. We observe only 4.59% (10.49%) of cities
where we cannot reject convexity (η2 > 0) for p-value < 0.01 (p-value < 0.1).
3.3 Residents’ land uses
In this subsection, we estimate residents’ land use. Toward this aim, we use the model with
Cobb-Douglas preferences because of their popularity and convenient properties in urban
economics.19
We suppose the presence of observable heterogeneity χ in the preference for land plots
or specific characteristics of locations as well as unobservable heterogeneity or measurement
errors . The utility function becomes
U(s, a, z, χ, ) = χz1−φ−ϕsφ(ea)ϕ.
We assume that the transport cost t = w(1 − e−τ(r)); thus, the net income is given by
19The results are similar when using hyperbolic preferences (Mossay and Picard 2012). See Supplementary
Material.
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y = w − t = we−τ(r), where τ(r) is a function of distance to the CBD. For simplicity, we
assume the quadratic form τ(r) = τ1×r+τ2×r2. Green area amenities are given by a = αx,
which can be written as a function of green urban areas g as a = αg/β, where α and β are
green amenity and land use intensity parameters, respectively. We can further standardize
the amenity value α = 1 and consider β as land use intensity to provide one unit for green
amenities. Taking the natural logarithm of (17) and adding the heterogeneity and error
terms, we obtain the following residential land use:
ln s = ln
(
1− ϕ− φ
1− ϕ
)− 1−ϕ−φ
φ
+
ϕ
φ
ln β − 1− ϕ− φ
φ
lnw
+
1− ϕ− φ
φ
τ1r +
1− ϕ− φ
φ
τ2r
2 − ϕ
φβ
g +
1
φ
ln u¯− 1
φ
lnχ− 1
φ
ln .
Accordingly, residents have larger land plots for cities with smaller incomes w, larger
distances between residences and the CBD r, smaller green urban areas g, higher outside
utility u, and smaller observable characteristics χ.
From these results, we build a regression model of residential land use
ln(sijc) = ϑ0 + ϑ1 lnwjc + ϑ2distijc + ϑ3dist
2
ijc + ϑ4gijc + ϑ5cIc + ϑ6Xjc + ϑ7Aijc + εijc
for the observations of annulus i in city j of country c. We measure the city wage wjc by the
per capita household net wage in the NUTS2 areas20 and the green urban areas gijc by the
land share of green urban areas (as in Table 2, Column (1)). Given language, cultural and
administrative barriers, we consider that individuals freely move across cities only within the
same country. Thus, the country utility level is captured by the vector of country dummies
Ic. Finally, vector Xjc controls for observed city characteristics, such as elevation, rainfall
and temperature. Vector Aijc controls for observed amenities in each annulus, such as the
shares of sport leisure facilities and industrial lands and the shares of forest and agricultural
lands within a 100 m distance from the residential areas.
20In this text, city wages are measured by the incomes net of taxes at the NUTS2 level. Net incomes closely
reflect the budget constraints faced by residents in their land use choices. However, NUTS2 encompasses
larger areas than the cover of many cities, which may downward bias city income values. In Appendix C, we
perform the same analysis with the production value at the NUTS3 level, which includes taxes. The results
are similar except the values should be interpreted differently.
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A potential endogeneity issue arises because the choices for residents’ land use and plan-
ers’ green urban areas are intertwined. Indeed, urban planers are expected to organize green
urban areas as a function of surrounding population densities and therefore residents’ land
use. To control for such a reverse causality, we use the historical level of urban green areas
as indicative of the current ones. The main idea behind using historical urban green area
information is that once an urban green area is developed, it is rarely changed. In fact,
many urban green areas in Europe were provided decades ago and have remained intact.
Examples are Hype Park in London, created around the 16th century by Henry VIII and
originally intended for hunting, and the ‘Jardin du Luxembourg’ was first built as a private
garden of Queen Marie de Medici in the early 17th century. Both private parks were later
converted to public green areas by public authorities. Thus, we can mitigate the reverse
causality using the data for old parks to predict the locations of current public green areas.
Toward this aim, we use the Corine Land Cover 1990 database, which unfortunately does
not cover all GMES Urban Atlas countries. As a result, the regression results exclude cities
in the UK, Sweden and Finland.21 The details for the first-stage regression are reported in
Appendix C, which confirm that the historical levels of urban green areas are a good proxy
or predictor of the current levels.
The results are reported in Table 5. Columns (1) to (4) display OLS estimates with-
out instrument variables. In all columns, the coefficient estimates are consistent with our
model predictions: residents use larger land plots for smaller city income, larger distance
between residences and the CBD and smaller green urban areas. The results are robust after
controlling for country fixed effects, city geographical conditions, such as elevation, rainfall
and temperature (see Column (2) and (3)) and different types of amenities within annuli
(see Column (4)). We applied the same level of controls for IV regression, which is shown
in Column (5) to Column (8). The IV regression reports slightly stronger effects of urban
green areas on the residential slot size than those of the OLS regressions, which is intuitive
because the historical level of urban green areas was lower than the current level. We also
apply the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (reported in Appendix C). The Wu-Hausman
21Corine Land Cover (CLC) 1990 does not cover the UK, Sweden and Finland. The database covers
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland, Por-
tugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey, out of which 23 countries are included in our
data. For details, see Corine Land Cover 1990 Metadata: https://land.copernicus.eu/pan-european/corine-
land-cover/clc-1990?tab=metadata (Accessed May 02, 2018). To our knowledge, CLC 1990 is the oldest
land use database that systematically covers all of Europe.
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test coefficient is not significant at the 90% confidence level, meaning that we can confirm the
alternative hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 90% confidence level, which further implies
that endogeneity may not be a critical issue in our analysis. Both the OLS and IV results
show significant coefficients for the share of green urban area amenities g for approximately
2.24−2.25 before including the control and 1.69−1.86 after including all other controls. This
finding implies that, ceteris paribus, residents in annuli with no green urban areas use 14%
more land than those residing in annuli with a 7% share of green urban area.22 Population
densities are reduced in the same proportions. According to this empirical estimation, green
urban areas are an important factor explaining the use of residential land and population
density.
22We compute sijc/si′jc = e
ϑ3(gijc−g′ijc), with gijc = 0 and 0.07.
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3.4 Counterfactual Analysis
In this subsection, we use the previous regression model to quantify the value of green urban
areas. We recover all parameters of our theoretical model and run several counterfactual
analyses. In particular, we build counterfactuals where half of the green urban areas are
deleted in every annulus and are either left unused or converted to new residential land.
We can then evaluate the changes in the residential land use and consumption of goods,
population density, land rents and utility levels for each city. To express utility changes
more intuitively, we measure the cost to residents by their incentives to leave the city and
wage compensation (subsidy or tax) that they must receive to keep their utility levels. By
the same token, we discuss the distribution of the effect of green urban areas between cities
and within them. We consider this analysis a useful exercise because it informs policy makers
about the impact of urban green areas on city structures and sizes.
We recover the model parameters from the estimated coefficient of residents’ land use
using the values of ϑ0, ϑ1, ϑ2, ϑ3 and ϑ4 from Column (8) in Table 5. Country utility levels
are recovered from the parameters ϑ5c and the constant term ϑ0. Our baseline model and
counterfactuals use the observed distance to the city center, city and country caracteristics
and local (non-green) amenities. The baseline model simulates the variables under study
using those estimated parameters and the observed characteristics (distance to CBD, wage,
green urban areas, ...). The counterfactual exercises investigate the impact of canceling 50%
of the urban green areas in each annulus of each city, keeping the same observed character-
istics. Counterfactual exercise 1 considers open cities where utility levels and unobserved
heterogeneity are maintained. This helps us discuss a long-term and unregulated perspective,
where urban planners do not impose restrictions on workers’ mobility within and between
cities. Counterfactual exercise 2 considers closed cities with exogenous city populations. The
study of closed cities can be appropriate in evaluating policy changes that occur simultane-
ously in all cities, such as changes in EU policies.23 Here, our aim is to discuss a midterm
or regulated perspective, where urban planners are able to restrict workers’ mobility be-
tween cities but allow residents’ land use to change. To give a relevant measure of utility
change, we also compute the compensating variation wage as the city wage that maintains
the baseline utility level when we remove green urban areas. Counterfactual exercises 1 and
2 hinge on the assumption that empirical model residuals reflect land heterogeneity that is
23Cheshire and Shepard (2002) also use the closed city model to analyze the welfare effects of policy
changes in the UK.
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unobserved to the econometricians but observed and used by residents in their land plot size
choices. Such heterogeneity is reported in the counterfactual results. This assumption may
be strong, as it imposes strong information on behalf of residents. Therefore, we also take
the opposite view in counterfactuals 3 and 4 where the residuals consist of measurement
errors that can be observed neither by the econometricians nor the residents. The details of
the counterfactual analyze are relegated to Appendix D.
The results of the baseline model are displayed in Table 6(a). The first column reports
the number of cities in the baseline exercise. Every other column reports the average and
standard deviation over the city averages imputed from the baseline model. The second and
third columns show the consumptions of composite goods and housing by households, while
the fourth column displays the net income. The difference between this column and the sum
of the two previous columns accounts for commuting costs. On average, individuals have
e15,220 as disposable income and spend e6,920 for housing expenses, which account for
approximately 45% of their net income. Such a figure is slightly above the average housing
costs in European cities, which are approximately a quarter of the household income for
both European rural and urban areas. The literature reports a range between 18% and 32%,
with higher levels for urban areas and renters (Fahey et al, 2004, Davis and Ortalo-Magne,
2011). Our model differs from this literature because we do not take into account housing
furniture and maintenance (5% of housing costs in Eurostats, 2015), consider city cores,
which have more expensive housing locations, and finally do not model the construction
process. The last two columns of Table 6(a) report the average residential area and green
urban area across cities, the latter being about one-fifth of the former. The rows address
the cases when we consider the regression model error as a spatial amenity for the residents
(spatial heterogeneity) and when we do not (no heterogeneity). The difference between the
two cases is not large.
Table 6 (a): Counterfactual analysis: open and closed cities
Cities Composite Housing Income Residential Green
Goods (Z) Rent (R× s) (W ) Area Area (GA)
number (e1000) (e1000) (e1000 ) (km2) (km2)
Spatial heterogeneity 264 5.05 6.92 15.22 25.29 4.52
(1.87) (2.56) (5.87) (48.91) (9.87)
No spatial heterogeneity 264 5.03 6.89 15.22 25.29 4.52
(1.86) (2.55) (5.87) (48.91) (9.87)
Note: The standard deviation is reported in the parenthesis. Household income is taken from Eurostat at NUTS2 level and is
measured on purchasing power standard (PPS) at 1000e. More details on PPS measure, please check Eurostat technical
documents.
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Our main results are displayed in Table 6(b), which shows the baseline model (first row)
and the counterfactual exercises (other rows) for cases with and without spatial heterogeneity.
The table structure is the same as that of Table 6(a). Every column reports the average and
standard deviation of the city averages over annuli imputed in the baseline and counterfactual
exercises. Consider the first row, which presents our baseline model and permits comparison
with the literature. The first five columns display the imputed residential surfaces, land
rents on units of residential plots and green urban areas, population and relative utility.
The average city size of 0.31 million inhabitants is consistent with the statistics that most
European cities are medium-sized (European Commission and UN-Habitat (2017), Urban
Audit, Eurostat). Residents’ average use of space is approximately 95 m2; the measure is
reasonable given that we consider the core of the most populous cities in the EU, which are
the densest areas of the most urbanized parts of the EU.24 The land rent per square meter
is 93.41 e/m2/year on average for all cities. On average, the land values of green urban
areas (102.32 e/m2/year) are higher than residential land prices. These values are imputed
from the residential land price associated with each annulus. Because urban green areas
are concentrated at close and intermediate distances to CBDs, they are surrounded by more
expensive residential land plots.
Consider, now, counterfactual exercise 1, where one removes 50% of the green areas in
every annulus of open cities. In open city systems, the utility of city inhabitants is exogenous,
but the change in green amenities affects the urban structures. Suppose, furthermore, the
case where the removed land is not (re)used, as indicated in the second row of Table 6(b).
To keep the same utility level, residents must compensate for the decrease in urban green
amenities by larger residential plots, which implies that a share of the population must
migrate out of the city. On average, city residents raise their land use from 95 to 100 m2 (a
rise of 5.3%), and the city population falls from 0.31 to 0.29 million (a loss of 6.5%). Land
rents fall from 93.41 to 87.11 e per m2 and year (a fall of 6.74%). We compute the total
loss in the land market to be approximately e147 million for an average city.25
Suppose now that 50% of green urban areas are converted into residential land, as shown
in the third row of Table 6(b). In an average city, there is a new land supply of 2.26 km2
(half of 4.52km2) on top of the baseline residential land supply of 25.29 km2, a rise of 8.9%
24They are more densely populated than US cities.
25To estimate the total land rent loss, we multiply the city residential area of each annulus with the per-
square-meter land rent loss between the baseline and counterfactual models, aggregate over the city, and
compute the average over all cities.
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(see Table 6(a)). This rise is slightly more than the 5.3% space compensation that residents
required without land conversion. As a result, the additional land supply attracts new city
dwellers, and the city population rises to 0.32 million on average. Residential land rents
rise slightly to 87.64 e per m2 and year because the new land is supplied at more central
locations with higher values. We compute that, compared to the baseline model, the housing
market increases its total value by nearly e55 millions per year and city when we take into
account converted areas.
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Counterfactual exercise 2 allows us to discuss the impact of reducing urban green areas
by half in closed cities where city planners prohibit migration. As predicted by our the-
oretical model, when there is no conversion of land, the utility of all residents decreases
once we reduce the level of urban green amenities. Specifically, the average utility decreases
from 1 to 0.94. This decrease requires an increase in the baseline annual net income of
e15, 200 to the compensating-variation income of e16, 650, an increase of e1, 430 (9.4%).
Multiplying this figure by the city population, we obtain a subsidy of e580 million for an
average city. Residential land rents decrease only by a small amount from 93.41 e/m2/year
to 93.36e/m2/year, providing a total loss of e1.82 million per year.
Suppose now that green urban areas are converted into residential land. Then, the
residential land supply increases, land rents decreases, and residents can use more land to
compensate for the loss of green area amenities. Specifically, the land rents drop by 9.6%
to 84.47 e/m2/year, and the total loss in housing market increases to e3.45 millions per
year. However, city residents enjoy both lower land rent and larger residential land plots,
which increase their average utility level. They obtain a slightly higher average utility level
(increase by 3%) and require a smaller compensating-variation wage of e14, 570 per year to
maintain their level of utility, which is equivalent to an income reduction of e650 per year.
The bottom panel of Table 6(b) replicates the above analysis when we replace the as-
sumption of unobserved spatial heterogeneity by that of measurement errors. It can be
seen that most effects are similar. The main differences lie in the level of averages and
standard deviations of our variables of interest. On the one hand, the standard deviations
are naturally smaller because residents are no longer assumed to consider spatial amenity
variations in their choices. However, the reduction in the standard deviation is not drastic,
which shows that the model is already well explained by the independent variables of the
regression model. On the other hand, the assumption of measurement errors also alters the
average values of imputed variables. For instance, in the baseline model of the bottom panel,
the residential populations, land uses and land rents are smaller than in the baseline model
of the top panel. This is because those variables are nonlinear functions of the error term ε
under the Cobb-Douglas preferences.26
What type of cities are more sensitive to removing green urban areas? Where in the
city are the changes more important? To answer these questions, we compare the impact of
26The expression of land use sˆ(w, r, g, u, ) includes a term eε that is a convex function of ε. Similarly, the
expression for the population density 1/sˆ(w, r, g, u, ε) includes a term e−ε, which is also a convex function
of ε.
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removing or converting green urban areas between cities of different incomes and population
sizes as well as between within-city locations at different distances to the CBD. Towards this
aim, Table 7 reports the baseline wage (first row), the changes in the compensating-variation
wages to sustain constant utility (next four rows), the baseline land rent to landlords (sixth
row), and the landlords’ losses (last four rows) when we group cities by income quartiles
(first four columns), by population size quartiles (next four columns) and by quartiles of
relative distances to the CBD (last four columns). The positive changes in compensating-
variation wages can be interpreted as subsidies required to maintain the residents at their
baseline equilibrium levels. Table 7 presents the results for open and closed cities with and
without the conversion of green urban areas to residential land. All figures are aggregated
from the same counterfactual exercise with unobserved spatial heterogeneity and with the
50% reduction in the green urban areas presented in Table 6(a) and (b).
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Let us consider first the case of open cites (counterfactual exercise 1). The reduction
in green urban area amenities harms residents who partly leave the city. Because of free
migration, city residents keep the same utility as in the country side and ask for no com-
pensation to stay in cities, which is why the second and third rows in Table 7 display a set
of zeros for the change in compensating-variation wages. By contrast, landlords lose money.
If urban green areas are not converted to residential land, they lose e3.27 and e8.22 per
m2 and year in cities belonging to the bottom and upper income quartiles, respectively (see
seventh row). Similarly, they lose e5.21 and e7.90 per m2 and year in cities belonging to
the bottom and upper population quartiles, respectively. This result is explained by the fact
that land value, city size and income are positively correlated. Landlords also lose e11.24
per m2 and year in the central city quartile but only e3.89 per m2 and year in the city
periphery quartile, indicating that land rents decrease with distance from the CBD. This
pattern remains approximately the same if urban green areas are converted to residential
land (eighth row). In this case, the above figures decrease by approximately e1 per m2 and
year in the lowest income and population size cities but only slightly for the highest ones.
The conversion of green urban areas mitigates the conclusions only to a small extent.
Let us now consider closed cities in which migration is restricted and half of the green
urban areas is removed (conterfactual exercise 2). Suppose, initially, no land conversion
(fourth row in Table 7). To stay in the city, residents require an increase in compensating-
variation wages, or subsidy, of e770 per year for the bottom city income quartile and e2, 090
per year for the top one. This increase represents up to 9.1% and 9.6% of the baseline net
incomes. These subsidies also increase with city population. One can check that larger cities
require proportionally higher subsidies, which result from the higher losses incurred by the
residents in larger cities. The subsidy is not monotonic with distance to the city center: it
first increases from e1, 600 to e1, 850 per year when one moves from the first to the second
distance quartiles and then drops to e1, 120 for the last distance quartile. This pattern
reflects the geographical distribution of the share of green urban areas (see Section 3.2). It
can finally be seen that landlords are not substantially harmed by the reduction in green
urban areas when cities are closed and land is not converted (ninth row).
Finally, suppose that the green urban areas are converted to residential land (fifth row),
which increases the residential land supply and compensates residents for the lack of green
area amenities. The negative changes in the compensating-variation wages indicate that
residents are better off in this situation. Low-income cities would accept lower compensating-
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variation wages and would therefore pay a tax of e360 per year in the lowest city income
quartiles and e900 per year in the highest. As shown in the table, this benefit is larger for
peripheral residents. Finally, landlords are negatively affected by the additional supply of
residential land (see tenth row). They are more impacted in the richest and the largest cities
and at the most central locations.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss the patterns of urban green areas in cities from theoretical and
empirical perspectives. Urban green areas mainly include green areas maintained for recre-
ational purposes by non-private human institutions (typically, municipalities). Green urban
areas provide residents with amenities that have the property of local public goods and high
land intensity. We find that the optimal provision of urban green areas is a nonmonotonic
concave function of the distance to CBDs. It results from the balance between the higher
opportunity cost of land near CBDs and the lower population density at city edges.
This property is confirmed by our study of the urban land use in the 305 most populous
urban EU areas. We use detailed maps of urban land use from the European Environment
Agency (GMES) to study the spatial configurations of urban green areas. Our study shows
a concave and hump-shaped profile of urban green areas with respect to distance to the
CBD. The result is robust to many variations in the land use specifications, city structure
specifications, and city and country characteristics.
We finally quantify the value of green urban areas by presenting a set of counterfactual
exercises, where half of the green urban areas are removed. We estimate that, on average,
open cities lose more than 6.5% of their population and that landlords lose e147 millions
in each city and year if the green urban areas are not converted into residential land. If
they are converted, the total residential land supply increases by 8.9%, which is sufficient
to compensate locals with additional residential space and to attract new city dwellers.
Compared to our baseline model, the housing market increases its total value by nearly e55
millions per year and city. In closed cities where the green urban areas are not converted,
city governments need to offer an average compensation of e1, 430 per person and year to
the residents for them to maintain their utility levels. To our knowledge, this paper is the
first urban economics contribution that quantifies the benefit of green urban areas in such a
way.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Samuelson Rule We can transform expression (5) in the Samuelson’s optimality con-
dition of public goods. Plugging the optimal residential space condition z˜ − sz˜s = y in the
land value V = (y − z˜) /s gives V = −z˜s. At the same time, applying the envelop theorem
on V yields Va ≡ −z˜a/ŝ > 0. Finally, using z˜s = −Us/Uz and z˜a = −Ua/Uz, expression (5)
can be written as (6).
Cobb Douglas preferences Under extreme value theorem, there always exists a
global maximum for a continuous function on a compact set; therefore, there always ex-
ists solution for city planner as x is always within the domain [0, 1
β
].
We denote the marginal welfare by F (x)−G(y) where F (x) = eAx(B−Cx) and G(y) =
κγy−
1−ϕ
φ u
1
φ > 0 are the LHS and RHS of the FOC condition (19) while x ∈ [0, 1/β], A =
αϕ/φ > 0, B = αϕ − βφ, and C = αβϕ > 0. If B ≤ 0, then F (x) − G(y) < 0 for
x ∈ [0, 1/β], so that the optimal service is the corner solution: x∗ = 0. If B > 0 then,
F (−∞) = 0, F (0) > 0 and F (∞) = −∞ while F (x) has a unique maximum at x¯ such
that F (x¯) ≥ F (x) and F (x¯) > 0. It can be checked that F (1/β) < 0. As a result F (x)
has a single root for x < 1/β. If AB < C ⇐⇒ x¯ < 0, F (x) is a decreasing function and
there exists a single root x′ for F (x) − G(y) = 0 iff F (0) > G(y). The optimal service is
then x∗ = x′. If AB > C ⇐⇒ x¯ > 0, F (x) is a bell-shaped function and there exist two
roots for F (x) − G(y) = 0 iff F (x¯) > G(y). The highest root x′′ has F ′(x′′) < 0 and gives
the optimal service: x∗ = x′′. To sum up, there exists an interior optimal service x∗ > 0 if
F (max(0, x¯)) > G(y). At the interior optimal service x∗, F ′(x∗) < 0.
To get the comparative statics w.r.t. y on the interior optimum x∗, we denote K(x, y) ≡
F (x) − G(y). So, Kx(x∗, y) = F (x∗) < 0, Kxy(x∗, y) = 0, Ky(x∗, y) = −G′(y) > 0,
and Kyy(x
∗, y) = −G′′(y) < 0. Then, we get dx∗/dy = −Fy/Fx > 0 and d2x∗/dy2 =
− (KyyKx −KyKxy) / (Kx)2 = −Kyy/Kx < 0.
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Appendix B: Data and robustness check for urban green
space profiles
Definitions
We first summarize the definitions of urban area entities. Eurostat uses three level of spatial
units that are based on clusters of high density grid cells and urban cores. Following Euro-
stat a high density grid cells are defined as population grid cells of one kilometer square with
at least 1, 500 inhabitants. A cluster of high density cells is a set of high density grid cells
that are each surrounded by at least five other high density cells (over the eight surrounding
cells). Clusters exclude the high density grid cells that are not connected or isolated. An
urban core is a cluster of high density cells that totals at least 50, 000 inhabitants. The first
level of spatial unit is the City. It is related to an urban core and defined by the local ad-
ministrative boundary so that more than 50% of inhabitants live inside the associated urban
core.27 The second level of spatial unit is the Greater City, which is created when the urban
population resides far beyond the local administrative boundaries. Greater cities like Greater
Manchester, Greater Nottingham and Greater Paris have been defined with alternative but
close definitions. In most cases, a Greater City contains a single City. The City, Greater
City (CGC) includes those two levels. A Functional Urban Area (FUA) combines the city
area and its commuting zone, as defined in the EU-OECD functional urban area definition
(OECD, 2013). A FUA includes the ”working catchmen area” of a city and is defined as
the collection of all surrounding municipalities with at least 15% of their employed residents
working in the associated urban core. Figure B1 presents the three different levels of spatial
units for Dublin.
Hypothesis testing of Table 2
Table B1 reports the p-value associated to Table 2 columns (1) to (6). Those values are
extremely small, corroborating the strong non-monotone relationship.
27There are some exception to this rule when the geography is disrupted by a river, a lake, fjords, or steep
slopes etcetera, making it hard to recover the urban core. In this case, the City can be added to cover this
urban centre.
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Figure 5: Figure B1: Eurostat levels of spatial units (Source: Eurostats)
Table B1: P-values for one-sided t-test for baseline models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H0 : β0 > 0 1.23× 10−58 1.39× 10−6 2.01× 10−160 2.00× 10−24 3.55× 10−10 1.28× 10−24
H0 : β1 > 0 4.16× 10−11 4.99× 10−11 7.88× 10−11 2.29× 10−4 4.31× 10−4 4.90× 10−7
H0 : β2 < 0 5.14× 10−20 5.60× 10−20 1.31× 10−19 5.11× 10−10 1.55× 10−5 2.68× 10−9
Note: The covariance matrix for residuals used for hypothesis testing is clustered at city level and heteroskedastic-robust.
Polycentric cities
In the GMES EU27 database, some cities develop in a polycentric way and host several
urban cores that are physically separated but economically connected. Column (6) in Table
3 excludes EU polycentric cities using an OECD study on polycentric cities. In the latter,
OECD assigns a polycentric status to a FUA using the percentage of residential population
commuting from one urban core to another. A polycentric city includes two or more urban
cores, which are connected and attract at least 15% of each other’s population as workforce
(OECD, 2013).
Furthermore, the column (6) of Table 3 focuses on the 21 countries that are common to
the 27 countries in GMES EU27 database and the 23 countries in the OECD study. This
excludes six EU27 countries (Bungaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Cyrus) and
2 OECD countries (Switzerland and Norway). Table B2 reports the population statistics of
monocentric and polycentric cities for those 21 countries. There are 18 FUAs with two urban
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centres, and 6 FUAs with more than two urban cores (Barcelona, Paris, Lyon, Amsterdam,
Stockholm and London). We will exclude all those FUAs in our sample. Finally, since the
OECD study concentrates on cities with more 500,000 inhabitants, we keep only the cities
with same sizes in the robustness of column (6) of Table 3. This excludes the GMES 27
’small’ sized cities that we used in other robustness analyses.
Table B2: Descriptive statistics for EU metropolitan forms in OECD database
average sd min max observations
Monocentric Cities
Population of metro area (thousands) 1235 890 445 4399 87
Population of city area (thousands) 772 633 90 3467 87
Duocentric Cities
Population of metro area (thousands) 1713 1609 561 7079 18
Population of city area (thousands) 1187 1274 314 5264 18
Polycentric Cities (with more than three centers)
Population of metro area (thousands) 5786 5030 1096 12401 6
Population of city area (thousands) 4487 4105 1331 9942 6
Note: Table B2 includes 21 countries: All EU27 except Bungaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Cyrus. Metro
population is computed from Census 2010 according to OECD metropolitan boundary maps in 2001. The metropolitan
population is very similar to the FUA population provided in Urban Audit database of Eurostat. For more details, see OECD
Metropolitan Explorer database, version June 2016 (OECD, 2016).
Table B3 provides further robustness analysis on the city border determination. It reports
regressions coefficient when the city border is defined by various shares of residential density:
15%, 20%, 25% and 30%. Coefficient signs are unaffected by those definitions in both the
quadratic and cubic models.
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Table B3: Profile of green urban areas (EU27): Robustness with different levels of cut-off
Dependent variable: Share of Green Urban Area
Quadratic Cubic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Border cut-off 15% 20% 25% 30% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Distance 0.065∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.045)
Distance square −0.116∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ − 0.697∗∗∗ −0.591∗∗∗ −0.470∗∗∗ −0.449∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.079) (0.080) (0.085) (0.093)
Distance cubic 0.380∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.052) (0.056)
Constant 0.099∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
City FE X X X X X X X X
Sample of cities All All All All All All All All
Observations 16,819 13,091 10,188 8,156 16,819 13,091 10,188 8,156
Adj. R2 0.399 0.369 0.344 0.327 0.416 0.379 0.349 0.331
df 16,513 12,785 9,882 7,850 16,512 12,784 9,881 7,849
F Statistic 37.65∗∗∗ 26.13∗∗∗ 18.50∗∗∗ 13.97∗∗∗ 40.09∗∗∗ 27.13∗∗∗ 18.84∗∗∗ 14.21∗∗∗
Note: Significance levels are denoted by ∗ for p<0.1, ∗∗ for p<0.05 and ∗∗∗ for p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at city
level and reported in parentheses. The row ”df” reports the degree of freedom. The table shows results from the regression of
share of green urban area within each annulus on the relative distance and its square to the city center using control variables
and a constant. The relative distance is normalized to one for farthest annulus for comparison. All columns include controls
for country and city size. The percentage of cut-off points is defined as the annuli with percentage of urban fabric areas over
the total area of the city within the annuli smaller than the percentage of the cut-off points indicated.
Table B4 presents regressions with alternative weighting schemes for observations. Larger
cities are less numerous but include larger populations and larger numbers of annuli, which
could influence the results. Table B4 reports the regression coefficients corresponding to
Table 2 with weights proportional to the city population (columns (1) and (4)) and the two
different measures of city population density (columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6)). Coefficients are
invariant to weighting specifications, which suggests low risk of misspecification.
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Table B4: Profile of green urban areas (EU27): Robustness with weighted OLS
Dependent variable: Share of Urban Green Space
Quadratic Cubic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance 0.166∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.016) (0.019) (0.029) (0.040) (0.047)
Distance square −0.187∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.625∗∗∗ −0.523∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.016) (0.019) (0.061) (0.094) (0.111)
Distance cubic 0.288∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.063) (0.074)
Constant 0.084∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
City Size FE X X X X X X
Sample of cities All All All All All All
Weighting City Pop. Pop. Density 1 Pop. Density 2 City Pop. Pop. Density 1 Pop. Density 2
Observations 13,117 13,117 13,117 13,117 13,117 13,117
Adj. R2 NA 0.111 0.115 NA 0.118 0.123
df 13086 13086 13086 13085 13085 13085
F Stat. 69.30∗∗∗ 27.99∗∗∗ 27.47∗∗∗ 68.17∗∗∗ 28.77∗∗∗ 28.20∗∗∗
Note: Significance levels are denoted by ∗ for p<0.1, ∗∗ for p<0.05 and ∗∗∗ for p<0.01. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. We include different weighting strategy. Weights are proportional to the city population (columns (1) and (4)).
Columns (2) and (5) include population density measured by dividing total city population with area of whole city. Columns (3)
and (6) measure city population by dividing city population to areas of artificial urban fabric, which mostly used for residential
purpose.
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Appendix C: First stage regression and Wu-Hausmann
Test for IV regressions
In this section, we report the first stage regression and the Wu-Hausman test for IV regres-
sion. We use the historical level of urban green spaces (land use code 141) in Corine Land
Cover in 1990 as our instrument variable. To our knowledge, Corin Land Cover (CLC) was
the first systematized the land use over whole Europe, and its earliest version was in 1990.
However, there are two issues with CLC 1990. First, CLC 1990 did not cover UK, Sweden
and Finland as those three countries only appeared in later version of Corine Land Cover
in 2000 onward. Therefore, we need to drop the city samples which belong to those three
above countries. Second, as CLC cover not only urban area but also the rural and all lands
in Europe. Hence, its resolution is much less precise than GMES Urban Atlas that covers
only urban areas. There are also discrepancies in these two databases. To decrease the
discrepancies, we use the land cover in CLC 2006 and GMES Urban Atlas 2006 and correct
for the discrepancies between these two sets. We assume that the changes between Corine
2006 and Corine 1990 is the evolution of urban green, while the difference between Corine
2006 and GMES 2006 are just discrepancies in measurement. We adjust the Corine 1990
with these measurement errors before using it in the first stage regression.
As showed in Table C1, the coefficient between adjusted urban green in Corine 1990 is a
very good predictors for the current level of urban green. The slope is highly significant and
is around 0.8. R2 is at 0.76−0.78. The Wu-Hausman test coefficient for endogeneity (vˆerror)
is not significant at 90% of confidence level, meaning that we can confirm the alternative
hypothesis of no endogeneity at 90% confidence level, which further implies that endogeneity
may not be a critical issue in this analysis.
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Table C1: First stage regression and Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity
First stage regression
Dependent variable:
Share of green area in GMES 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adjusted Share of green area in Corine 1990 0.802∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Adjusted R2 0.760 0.782 0.784 0.785
Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity
Dependent variable: Ln Residential Space
(1) (2) (3) (4)
vˆerror -0.421 0.603 0.581 0.429
(0.885) (0.472) (0.450) (0.429)
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
City Geographical Controls No No Yes Yes
Annuli Amenity Controls No No No Yes
Sample All All All All
Observations 10,853 10,853 10,853 10,853
Note: We use the following procedure to test for endogeneity. First Stage: gijc = αgCorine90 + ϑ
′Z + vijc. Second Stage:
ln sijc = ϑZ + ϑ4gijc + ϑerr vˆijc + εijc where Z is the vector ( 1 w dist Ic Xjc Aijc ) and vˆijc is the residuals from
first stage regression. Significance levels are denoted by ∗ for p<0.1, ∗∗ for p<0.05 and ∗∗∗ for p<0.01. The row ”df” reports
the degree of freedom. For city control, we take into account the elevation, average rain fall, average temperature in Jan 01
and average temperature in July 01 for period 1995-2010. The observations are all annuli of all cities covered by both GMES
and Corine Land Cover 1990. Other variables are those from original regression (GDP per capita at purchasing power
standard and distance to CBD). Regression (1) to (4) are corresponding to IV regression (5) to (8) in Table 5 in the main text
respectively.
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Appendix D: Counterfactural analysis
We recover the model parameters from the estimated coefficient of residents’ land use using
the values of ϑ0, ϑ1, ϑ2, ϑ3 and ϑ4 from Column (8) in Table 5. Country utility levels are
recovered from the parameters ϑ5c and the constant term ϑ0.
28. From the theoretical model,
we recover the residential space, composite goods and the residential land rent as
sˆ(w, r, g, u, ε) = (we−τˆ1r−τˆ2r
2
)ϑˆ1 u egϑˆ4+ϑˆ6Xjc+ϑˆ7Aijc+εˆijc
zˆ(w, r) = we−τˆ1r−τˆ2r
2
(
−ϑˆ1
1− ϑˆ1
)
Rˆ(w, r, g, u, ε) =
we−τˆ1r−τˆ2r
2 − zˆ(w, r)
sˆ(w, r, g, u,X, )
where we use τˆ1 = ϑˆ2/ϑˆ1, τˆ2 = ϑˆ3/ϑˆ1, and (1 − ϕˆ − φˆ)/(1− ϕˆ) = −ϑˆ1/(1− ϑˆ1). We first
define the baseline model and the counterfactual exercises. Both baseline and counterfactuals
use the observed distance to the city center rijc and amenities Xjc and Ajc. The baseline
model includes the observed city wage wjc, the share of green urban areas gijc, the estimated
values of country utility ûc and the unobserved heterogeneity or measurement error ε̂ijc.
Formally, we set the baseline model values to sˆ0ijc = sˆ(wjc, rijc, gijc, ûc, ε̂ijc), zˆ
0
ijc = zˆ(wjc, rijc)
and Rˆ0ijc = Rˆ(wjc, rijc, gijc, ûc, ε̂ijc).
We now investigate the impact of canceling 50% of the urban green areas in each annulus.
In counterfactual exercise 1, we consider open cities where utility levels and unobserved
heterogeneity are maintained at the estimated levels ûc and ε̂ijc. This consideration helps
us discuss a long-term and unregulated perspective, where urban planners do not impose
restrictions on workers’ mobility within and between cities. We then remove half of the green
urban areas by setting g′ijc = 0.5 × gijc. In both cases, we set sˆ1ijc = sˆ(wjc, rijc, g′ijc, ûc, ε̂ijc)
and zˆ1 = zˆ(wjc, rijc), while Rˆ
1 = Rˆ(wjc, rijc, g
′
ijc, ûc, ε̂ijc). Residents’ land use should increase
(sˆ1ijc > sˆ
0
ijc) because residents require compensation for the reduction of green area amenities.
If green urban areas are left with no use, the total available space remains constant and is
given by
∑
ijc (1− gijc) `ijc, where `ijc is the land surface of annulus i in city j and country
c. Since resident’s land use increases, cities host fewer residents. If green urban areas are
converted in residential land, city populations may grow if the new supply of land, g′ijc`ijc, is
28As we drop Austria in the country dummies, we have u
1/φ
at = ϑ0, and all other countries as u
1/φ
c = ϑ5c+ϑ0
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larger than the increase in residents’ land demand from sˆ0ijc to sˆ
1
ijc. More formally, population
grows if
∑
ijc (1− gijc) `ijc/s0ijc <
∑
ijc
(
1− g′ijc
)
`ijc/s
1
ijc.
In counterfactual exercise 2, we consider closed cities with exogenous city populations.
The study of closed cities can be appropriate in evaluating policy changes that occur simul-
taneously in all cities, such as changes in EU policies.29 Here, our aim is to discuss a midterm
or regulated perspective, where urban planners are able to restrict workers’ mobility between
cities but allow residents’ land use to change. We again remove half of the green urban ar-
eas (g′ijc = 0.5 × gijc). We set sˆ2ijc = sˆ(wjc, rijc, g′ijc, u2jc, ̂ijc), zˆ2ijc = zˆ(wjc, rijc) and Rˆijc
2
=
Rˆ(wjc, rijc, g
′
ijc, u
2
jc, ̂ijc), where u
2
jc is the counterfactual city utility level. In the absence of the
conversion of green urban areas to residential plots, we set the city utility level u2jc such that
the city population spreads over the baseline residential area; that is, we impose that each u2jc
solves the population identity
∑
i(1− gijc)lijc/sˆ0ijc =
∑
i(1− gijc)lijc/sˆ2ijc. In the case of land
conversion, we set u2jc such that the city population spreads over the new residential land
supply. Then, u2jc solves the population identity
∑
i(1−gijc)`ijc/sˆ0ijc =
∑
i(1−g′ijc)`ijc/sˆ2ijc.30
However, although utility levels are important concepts in welfare analysis, they are difficult
to interpret quantitatively. Therefore, we also compute the compensating variation wage
w2jc as the city wage that maintains the baseline utility level when we remove green urban
areas, which is equivalent to setting the wage w2jc such that the above population identities
hold with sˆ(w2jc, rijc, g
′
ijc, ûjc, ε̂ijc). Under the Cobb-Douglas preferences, this assumption
simplifies to the compensating variation wage w2jc = wjc(u
2
jc/u
0
jc)
1
ϑˆ1ϕˆ .
The above two counterfactual exercises hinge on the assumption that empirical model
residuals εijc reflect land heterogeneity that is unobserved to the econometricians but ob-
served and used by residents in their land plot size choices. Such heterogeneity is reported in
the counterfactual results. This assumption may be strong, as it imposes strong information
on behalf of residents. Therefore, we take the opposite view and assume that the residuals
εijc consist of measurement errors that can be observed neither by the econometricians nor
the residents. In that case, residents do not base their decisions on εijc, and we set εijc = 0
in counterfactual exercises 3 and 4.
29Cheshire and Shepard (2002) also use the closed city model to analyze the welfare effects of policy
changes in the UK.
30This approach yields the counterfactual utility levels
(
u2jc
)1/φ
= (uc)
1/φ (
∑
i(1−gijc)`ijc/s2ijc)
(
∑
i(1−gijc)`ijc/sijc)
and(
u2jc
)1/φ
= (uc)
1/φ (
∑
i(1−g′ijc)`ijcs2ijc)
(
∑
i(1−gijc)`ijc/sijc)
.
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Supplementary Material A: NUTS3 incomes
In this section, we report the results of estimation of the structural model using GDP per
capita at NUTS3 level as the proxy for city wage. The results are similar to those in Table
5 in main text.
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Table A1a: First stage regression and Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity
First stage regression
Dependent variable:
Share of green area in GMES 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adjusted Share of green area in Corine 1990 0.797∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Adjusted R2 0.759 0.781 0.784 0.784
Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity
Dependent variable: Ln Residential Space
(1) (2) (3) (4)
vˆerror −0.330 0.413 0.406 0.241
(0.911) (0.455) (0.438) (0.407)
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
City Geographical Controls No No Yes Yes
Annuli Amenity Controls No No No Yes
Sample All All All All
Observations 10,853 10,853 10,853 10,853
Note: We using the following procedure to test for endogeneity. First Stage: gijc = αgCorine90 + ϑ
′Z + vijc; Second Stage:
ln sijc = ϑZ+ϑ3 ln (g0 + gijc) +ϑerr vˆijc+ εijcwhere Z is the vector ( 1 w dist Ic Xjc ) and vˆijc is the residuals from
first stage regression. Significance levels are denoted by ∗ for p<0.1, ∗∗ for p<0.05 and ∗∗∗ for p<0.01. The row ”df” reports
the degree of freedom. For city control, we take into account the elevation, average rain fall, average temperature in Jan 01
and average temperature in July 01 for period 1995-2010. The observations are all annulus from all cities covered by both
GMES and Corine Land Cover 1990. Other variables are those from original regression (GDP per capita at purchasing power
standard and distance to CBD). Regression (1) to (4) are corresponding to IV regression (5) to (8) in Table A1 respectively.
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